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According to the Supreme Court in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.,' the requirements for copyright infringement are
"(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original."2 Thus, given ownership of a
valid copyright, copying of "constituent elements of the work that are
original" is both a necessary and sufficient condition for infringement of
the work. The apparent simplicity of this formulation is, however,
misleading, because the Court added a novel creativity requirement to
the traditional understanding of what constitutes an original work of
authorship, a requirement that plays a critical role in determining the
scope of copyright protection for factual works.3 The addition was based
on confusion between language and the world, and the resulting
formulation conflates the roles of the two parts of Section 102 of the
Copyright Act and muddles the purpose of Section 102(b). The concept
of creativity should be irrelevant in determining the scope of copyright
protection for factual works, which is explained by the purpose of such
works: the communication of information. Repetition of the Feist
formulation confuses copyright law in critical respects and hinders
progress as copyright law seeks to address new forms of communication
and new areas of technology.
The Confusion Underlying Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.
Despite the Court's requirement in Feist that the copied constituent
"elements" of a work be original,4 the Court did not mean to require that
the individual words or other smallest components of a literary work be
original in themselves; a literary work need not consist of neologisms in
order to be protected against copying. It is sufficient, under Feist, that
components that are not necessarily original in themselves, e.g., words of
a natural language, be combined-"selected, coordinated, and
arranged"5-in a way that creates "constituent elements ... that are
original.", 6 The problem with this formulation lies in part with the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Id. at 361.
Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 361.
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meaning of the word "element" but primarily with the Court's
construction of the word "original." A work is not "original," according
to Feist, simply because it was created without being copied from any
other work, even if its words are arranged in a way in which words have
never before been arranged. In addition to having been independently
created, the work must "possess[] at least some minimal degree of
creativity." 7 Originality, as required for copyright8 protection, "requires
independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.",
Thus, copying a substantial portion of an independently created
literary work does not necessarily constitute infringement. 9 For example,
in Feist the Court held that Feist's copying of a substantial number of
Rural's "white pages" telephone directory listings was not infringement.
The reason it was not, according to the Court, lies in the concept of
originality, and specifically in the Court's finding in that concept of a
"creativity" component.' 0 Rural's listings were not original constituent
elements of its literary work because, according to the Court, facts are
not original. 1 "[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship"2
but are "merely discovered" by those who then "find and report" them.1
Since the facts themselves were not original, and Rural had not "selected,
coordinated, or arranged these uncopyrightable facts in an original
way,' 13 it had not shown "the minimal creative spark required by the
Copyright Act and the Constitution."' 4
This is a strange answer, because it is an answer to the wrong
question. The question was not whether facts-the things that the
telephone listings were about-were original, but whether the listings
themselves were original, for it was the copying of the listings that was at
issue. It is no surprise thatfacts are not created by authors. Facts are not
literary works, and so would not be entitled to copyright protection no
matter who created them. Nor do they need such protection, because it is
not even clear what it would mean to copy facts. Doing so would require
not an infringer but a magician (or perhaps a Creator).
Of course, if by "copying facts" we mean copying a listing, account,
or description of facts, it is clear what that means, and we know how to
do it. But listings, accounts, and descriptions were created by authorsthey "owe their origin to an act of authorship"' 5-and so can be original,
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

345.
346 (emphasis added).
361.
362-64.
350, 361.
347.
362.
363.
347.
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in the standard sense of having been independently created by their
17
author. 16 The Court's argument that facts are not created by authors
does not explain why copying Rural's telephone listings, which were
indeed created by authors, does not constitute infringement.
In short, the Court's explanation in Feist of "why facts are not
copyrightable"' 18 fails to address the issue before the Court. If by "facts"
the Court is referring to things in the world, such as the fact that the
world is round, or the fact that Tom Jones' address is 155 Boston Street
and his phone number is 545-343-1999, then indeed they are not created
by authors and in that sense are not creative or original. But they are also
not literary works or parts of them, so no one ever thought they could be
created by authors or subject to copyright protection. If, on the other
hand, by "facts" the Court means accounts of facts, such as the telephone
listings in Rural's white pages, then they will (unless copied from
another work) have been created by their author, and so be "original" in
the standard sense of having been independently created. The claim that
facts are not created by authors, therefore, provides no support for the
conclusion that Rural's telephone listings are not entitled to protection
against copying. A reader who copied listings would not be copying
facts, which the Court understandably said were not created by an author,
but instead language describing facts, which was created by an author.
The Court's metaphysical account therefore does not explain why
copyright protection does not extend to such copying.
The Irrelevance of Creativity to the Scope of Copyright Protection
Sources of the Confusion
The conflation of language and the world pervades Feist, starting
with the Court's formulation of the task before it as one of resolving the
tension between the non-copyrightability of facts and the copyrightability
of compilations of facts.' 9 There is, however, no tension here, and no
16. See Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir.
1951) ("'Original' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work
'owes its origin' to the 'author."'); Alan T. Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright,
39 B.U. L. REv. 526, 536 (1959) ("Originality in current usage connotes only that one's
work must be his own, in that it is not copied directly or indirectly from the work-product
of another."); I PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1 at 2:6 (2d ed. 2000) (hereinafter
GOLDSTEIN ) ("For purposes of copyright protection, a work is original if, and to the
extent that, it has not been copied from another source."). Prof. Goldstein goes on to
discuss delicately the "gloss" on the originality requirement added by the Court in Feist.
Id. at 2:8-2:12.
17. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
18. Id. at 345.
19. Id.
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mystery. Facts are not literary works and so may not be copyrighted.
Compilationsoffacts are literary works and so, if independently created,
ordinarily are entitled to copyright protection (although the scope of that
protection must be determined). The Court, ignoring the difference
between the world and the words that describe it, creates a factitious
mystery that it tries to resolve by adding to the standard concept of
originality the requirement of a "minimal degree of creativity.,, 20 But if
we are clear about the difference there is no reason or need to change our

ordinary understanding of originality, as applied to literary works, as
requiring simply independent creation.21
The Court's metaphysical explanation of why works that "consist of
nothing but raw data-i. e., wholly factual information not accompanied
by any original written expression, ' ,22 should not receive copyright
protection was accompanied by its account of how an author of a factual
work might nonetheless obtain copyright protection: by "cloth[ing] facts
with an original collocation of words, 23 or by providing a "selection or
arrangement" of facts that "display[s] some minimal level of
,24
creativity."
However, neither of these alternatives can survive
recognition of the failure to distinguish between language and the world.
If facts are things in the world not created by authors, We can neither
20. Id.
21. The Court cited the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), in support of the
proposition that being a "Writing" of an "Author," as provided in the Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution, requires creativity beyond that necessary to create a literary
work independently. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. However, the conclusion of lack of
originality in the Trade-Mark Cases was based on the fact that a "trade-mark may be, and
generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of
the party using it," and the trademark arises out of its use, not out of the creation of a new
symbol. 100 U.S. at 94. Thus a trademark does not even require the creation of a literary
work. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53 (1884), upon which the
Court in Feist also relied for its creativity requirement, the Court upheld the
copyrightability of photographs against the challenge that they involve "the mere
mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines of some object animate or
inanimate, and involves no originality of thought or any novelty in the intellectual
operation connected with its visible reproduction in shape of a picture." 111 U.S. at 59.
It found that, at least for the photographs before it, there was sufficient "originality, of
intellectual production, of thought, and conception," to support a copyright. Id. at 60.
However, a literary work that is original in the standard sense of not having been copied
from another work, even one such as a telephone book, does not result simply from a
mechanical operation of copying, which created the need in Burrow-Gilesfor the Court at
least to consider whether photography had an intellectual component justifying copyright
protection. Other decisions cited by the Court simply support the proposition that facts
are not copyrightable, not that a literary work created by an author must pass an
additional creativity hurdle, beyond independent creation, in order for copyright
protection to subsist in it.
22. Feist, 499 U.S at 345.
23. Id. at 348.
24. Id. at 358.
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clothe them with words nor pluck them out of the world to select or
rearrange them. Tom Jones and his telephone number will remain
unaffected by the choices made by the author of a white pages telephone
directory, whether they are choices of wording, selection, or
arrangement.
The Court's confusion in Feist was facilitated by the ambiguity of
the terms "information" and "data., 25 Each term can be used to refer
either to a linguistic entity, e.g., the sentence "Tom Jones' address is 155
Boston Street and his phone number is 545-343-1999," or to whatever
such a linguistic entity denotes-presumably in this case, if the sentence
is true, the fact that Tom Jones' address is 155 Boston Street and his
phone number is 545-343-1999. A factual compilation can "consist of
nothing but raw data" 26 only in the former sense, but in that sense it is a
linguistic entity that is indeed created by its author. If, however, by
"data" or "information" we mean whatever non-linguistic entity in the
world a listing or sentence tells us about, then a factual compilation
cannot consist of such things, because they do not consist of words or
symbols.
Thus when the Court asks in closing, "did Feist, by taking 1,309
names, towns, and telephone numbers from Rural's white pages, copy
anything that was 'original' to Rural, 27 the answer, if the Court is
referring to the listings in Rural's telephone white pages, is "Yes."
Assuming that Rural did not copy the entries from anyone else, the
listings were original to it, in the standard sense of Rural having
independently put one word after another to create them. Of course, if
the Court is referring to the things in the world to which the listings refer,
such as towns in Northwest Kansas, those things were not "original" to
or created by Rural. But neither were such things copied by Feist.
Monument, Kansas remains where it was, uncopied and unaffected by
Rural's or Feist's references to it. All that Feist took, or could take, was
part of a literary work created by Rural.
The Court's justification of its own negative answer to its closing
question simply trades on the ambiguity of the terms "data" and
"information." 28 The Court's confident contention that "these bits of
information are uncopyrightable facts; they existed before Rural reported
25. Id. at 361.
26. Id. at 345.
27. Id. at 361.
28. Id. ("Certainly, the raw data does not satisfy the originality requirement. Rural
may have been the first to discover and report the names, towns, and telephone numbers
of its subscribers, but this data does not 'owe its origin' to Rural. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S.
at 58. Rather, these bits of information are uncopyrightable facts; they existed before
Rural reported them and would have continued to exist if Rural had never published a
telephone directory.").
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them and would have continued to exist if Rural had never published a
telephone directory, 29 is especially striking: the people and towns of
Northwest Kansas, and the numbers assigned to them as telephone
numbers, would certainly have continued to exist whatever Rural or Feist
did or did not write, but they were not what Feist copied. In our current
digital world, what Feist copied was in all likelihood indeed "bits of
information ' '3 -the digital form of the literary work that Rural createdand those bits did not exist before Rural created its directory and existed
only in the form of that directory.
Creativity Without the Confusion?
Is there any reason to accept the Court's creativity requirement once
the metaphysical confusion that pervades the Court's argument is
discounted? Some might still believe that if one is merely reporting "raw
facts,' such as Rural's telephone listings, one has not shown sufficient
creativity to deserve the benefits of copyright protection. Even if one
does not confuse language and the world, one might argue, a work that
merely states straightforward facts is not "original" enough to be entitled
to protection. This argument is wrong for several reasons that are
important to the nature of copyright protection for factual works. I will
address some of those reasons at greater length below, but it is useful to
set them out initially here.
First, although the modified creativity argument may not expressly
rest on the conflation that pervades Feist, it remains infected by the idea
that, at least in simple cases, natural language simply copies or mirrors
the world. But that is never the case. Language is a discrete
combinatorial system in which a writer must select one word after
another to create meaningful sentences. The defining characteristic of
natural language is that one can, in this way, create a potentially infinite
number of different meaningful sentences, i.e., convey a potentially
infinite amount of information.32 Even in the simplest factual work, a
creative act, of which only33human speakers of natural languages are
capable, is being carried out.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31.

Id. at 350.

32.

See STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 84 (1994); RAY JACKENDOFF, THE
ARCHITECTURE OF THE LANGUAGE FACULTY 3 (1997).

33. Thus, as discussed supra, note 21, the Court's reliance on Burrow-Giles, which
cited the "intellectual invention" required to produce certain photographs in finding that
they were entitled to copyright protection, 111 U.S. at 60, is inapposite to the case of
natural language, which does not involve mirroring the world in the way that those
opposing the copyrightability of photographs might have argued that photographs do, but
involves creating information about the world by means of a discrete combinatorial
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More generally, the argument's picture of the relation between
language and the world is misguided. The world does not come to us
divided into "raw facts" labeled by sentences through which the facts
"speak for themselves, 3" and it is not made up of individual facts for
which there is one "real" description, with other descriptions constituting
"expressive" flourishes that copyright law can protect. If instead of
writing, "Tom Jones' address is 155 Boston Street and his phone number
is 545-343-1999," an author writes, "The studious Tom Jones lives at
number 155 on upscale Boston Street, with the easily remembered phone
number 545-343-1999," is she "expressively" describing the same raw
fact as in the simpler description, or is she instead accurately
describing-letting it "speak for itself'-a more complex fact that
includes attributes of Tom Jones and his address and phone number?
What one finds in the world, after all, is Tom Jones, who is studious,
skinny, likes to ski, is from Buffalo, and so on ad infinitum. Once we
move beyond a picture of the world being divided into "raw facts" to
which a writer might pin "creative" labels, there is no way in principle ' to
35
distinguish between an author using "an original collocation of words
to clothe simple facts in original garb-thus, according to Feist, being
' 36 entitled to copyright protection because of that "expressive element
and an author letting more complex facts "speak for themselves" with the
same words, and thus failing to qualify for copyright protection.37
The example facing the Court in Feist, telephone listings requiring
little "creativity" to discover and presented in only a few simple words
and numbers, 38 misled the Court into associating "raw facts" with a lack
of creativity and consequently of trying to explain through a creativity
requirement the need to permit such information to be copied. 39 But the
simplicity of a fact is no indication of the creativity, in the standard
sense, required to unearth it. Facts, even "raw facts," come in all kinds.
A listing of the atomic numbers of elements is even simpler than a
telephone listing ("Hydrogen, 1; Helium, 2;

. .

."). One might therefore

say, with a bit of exaggeration of Henry Moseley's personal
accomplishments, what the Court says of Rural's telephone listings in
denying them copyright protection for lack of creativity: "Moseley may
have been the first to discover and report the atomic numbers of the

system.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
Id.
Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 361-63.
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' 40
elements, but this data does not 'owe its origin' to Moseley.
But it is hardly a lack of creativity on the part of the discoverers of
atomic numbers that leads us to permit the copying of a list of such
numbers. Nor should copyright law be in the business of evaluating the
creativity of factual or scientific discovery. If we do not confuse
language and the world, the idea of courts determining copyright
protection by ranking facts in terms of creativity, or even determining
which facts require a "modicum of creativity" 4 1 to discover, is no more
appealing than the idea of courts determining such protection by
evaluating works of art.42
A second reason to reject the Court's account, even as modified, is
that, reflecting its underlying confusion between language and the world,
the account requires more than an evaluation of the creativity of a factual
work: it requires an evaluation of its truth. In the Court's view, a true
factual work would face the obstacle to copyright protection that its
author had only discovered, not created, the facts recounted, but the
author of a false factual work would face no such obstacle. To the
contrary, the author of the false work would, perhaps unknowingly, have
exhibited sufficient "creativity" to concoct something that did not exist,
and so, under the Court's explanation, be entitled to copyright protection.
This objection to the Court's account, dispositive in itself, arises out of
the fact that the account depends on an alleged metaphysical relationship
between the world and an "original" work of authorship, instead of on
the purpose of a factual work, as discussed further below.
Third, as also discussed below, by adding a creativity element to the
"originality" requirement, the argument confuses the general structure of
copyright law and the statutory scheme that reflects it. A literary work
must, on this view, have a modicum of creativity in order to qualify as an
43
original work of authorship in which copyright protection may subsist,
but since that modicum of creativity may be found in any part of the
work, the issue of the scope of protection remains. The Court therefore
limits such protection to the "original," i.e., the original+creative,
"elements" of a work, making each determination of the scope of
infringement into a test of "creativity" and ignoring both the separation

40. Henry Moseley discovered that the arrangement of elements in the periodic table
on the basis of their chemical attributes could be explained by their atomic numbers,
representing the number of units of positive charge, i.e., protons, in each element. See
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS 82 (Rita G. Lemer & George L. Trigg eds., 2d ed. 1991).
41. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
42. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits.").
43. Feist,499 U.S. at 362.
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of Section 102 of the Copyright Act into two parts with distinct tasks and
the traditional idea/expression distinction.
Fourth, the introduction of a creativity requirement is unnecessary,
for the scope of copyright protection can be properly limited without it,
simply by recognizing the different purposes of fictional and factual
works. Limiting the scope on the basis of a work's purpose not only
avoids the metaphysical confusion and misunderstanding of language
inherent in the creativity requirement but also enables us to make rational
and informed determinations about the proper scope of protection in light
of the various considerations that should govern them.
The Court's addition in Feist of a "creativity" requirement to the
standard concept of originality, in order to explain the limited scope of
copyright protection for factual works, had little to recommend it beyond
the apparent simplicity of the Court's argument. Once it transpires that
the argument is based on an equally simple confusion, it is time to look
elsewhere for an explanation of the limitation.
The Paradox of Copyright Protection and its "Solution"
Protected and UnprotectedMatter
There is indeed a tension underlying copyright law as it applies to
literary works, but it is not the tension described by the Court in Feist,
and it does not depend on a metaphysical confusion. The tension is so
strong as to amount to a paradox, the paradox of copyright protection:
the value of literary works lies largely in the information they convey,
i.e., their content, 4 and that value is largely dependent on such content
44. 1 will not try here to define the term "information" but will rely on the common
understanding of the term. Although I am not using the term "information" in the
engineering sense as defined by Claude Shannon or in any other technical sense,
Shannon's explication, focusing on information as a reduction in uncertainty, reflects an
important aspect of the ordinary understanding of the concept. See Claude E. Shannon, A
Mathematical Theory of Communication (pts. 1 & 2), 27 BELL SYSTEM TECHNICAL
JOURNAL 379, 623 (1948), reprinted in CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE
MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949).

Similarly, the concept of content used in this article is easy to understand in a casual
sense but difficult to define, and common terminology is uncertain and can be confusing.
I will typically use the term "content" to refer to that which is conveyed by literary
works. I will sometimes use the term "factual content" to refer to content that purports to
be true, whether or not it succeeds in being so. (In contrast to the need for a distinction in
copyright law between fictional and purportedly factual works, there is no general need
for a distinction between purportedly factual works that are true, in whole or part, and
those that are false, in whole or part.) The term "content" is generally preferable to the
term "information" for the purpose of this article for several reasons, including the fact
that "content" does not share the technical connotations of "information"; "content,"
unlike one sense of "information," does not imply the truth of what is asserted; and
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being further transmitted, i.e., copied, in other literary works; yet
copyright law promotes the creation of literary works by prohibiting their
being copied.45 The solution to the paradox, to the extent that there is
one, lies in the distinction between protected and unprotected matter.
Copyright law promotes the advancement of knowledge, pursuant to the
Copyright Clause,46 through encouraging the creation of protected
works, which may not be copied, but whose unprotected content may be
copied, including copied for use in other works. It is such unprotected
content that is valuable, in large part because it may be freely copied,
and copyright law is only a means to the end of promoting the creation
and dissemination of such matter. By promoting the creation of
protected matter by prohibiting its being copied, copyright law promotes
the creation of unprotected matter, which is not protected against copying
but must be protected, or "immunized," as it were, against copyright law,
so as not to interfere with its further transmission.47
"content" reflects the dual aspect of a container-the literary work-and what is
contained in it, which "information" does not. However, it is not practical to use only
one term in this context, for both primary and secondary sources frequently use other
terms for the same or a similar purpose, e.g., "facts," "ideas," "information," "data," and
"discoveries." I will frequently use the term "information" with the same meaning as
"factual content."
45. Although the term "paradox of copyright protection" may or may not be novel,
the recognition of a tension underlying copyright law and the problems it creates is, of
course, common. See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports,
Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The contradiction between these imperatives, one
calling for the protection of creations that will advance the progress of knowledge, the
second requiring that these same creations be free of protection, has understandably given
rise to bewildering problems of interpretation as to whether copying has been of
protected expression or of the unprotected ideas underlying the expression.").
46. The Constitution grants Congress the power "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
8. Within, the clause, the term "Science" is to be read with the terms "Authors" and
"Writings," with the- "exclusive Right" being that of copyright, while the term "useful
Arts" is to be read with the terms "Inventors" and "Discoveries," with the exclusive
rights being patent rights. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56
(1884); Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir.
1951); I WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 123 (1994). I use the term
"Copyright Clause" to refer to the portion of Clause 8 dealing with copyright: "To
promote the Progress of Science..., by securing for limited Times to Authors... the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings....." U.S. CONST. art., I, § 8, cl. 8.
47. The paradox of copyright protection affects primarily literary works, and the
discussion in this article applies only to such works. Other types of work in which
copyright protection subsists (except dramatic works that are also literary works) have
different structures and purposes and raise different issues, and there is no reason to
believe that a single non-tendentious criterion can determine the scope of protection for
all of them. As noted above, supra note 21, the Court's effort in Feist to support its
addition of a creativity requirement with the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), and
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), failed in part because the
subject matter of those cases made the basis for and scope of trademark or copyright
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The Roles of Sections 102(a) and 102(b)
In the Copyright Act these two tasks are parceled out between
Section 102(a), granting copyright protection to literary works, and
Section 102(b), immunizing certain content of those works against the
protection granted by Section 102(a). In order for copyright protection to
subsist in a work under Section 102(a), it need only be an "original
work[] of authorship, 4 8 i.e., a work independently created by its author
and fixed in a tangible medium from which it can be perceived. Such a
work then constitutes protected matter, except to the extent that the
protection is limited by Section 102(b)'s recital of unprotected, i.e.,
immunized, matter.49

What makes the Feist Court's metaphysical wrong turn to Section
102(a) and the concept of creativity particularly puzzling is that it was
unnecessary, for the explanation of the lack of copyright protection for
Rural's listings was before it in Section 102(b). The Court even at one
point observed that "Section 102(b) is universally understood to prohibit
any copyright in facts," 50 but instead of seeing the provision as an
independent restriction on the scope of copyright protection, the Court
took it as an endorsement of its own explanation "that facts are never
original... ."" To the contrary, Section 102(b) says nothing of the sort,
any more than it says that ideas (to which, unlike facts, it expressly
refers) are never original. Copyright protection does not extend to
original ideas any more than it does to unoriginal ones, and it does not
extend to facts, however much creativity did or did not go into
discovering them.
Sections 102(a) and (b) thus divide between them the two tasksdetermining the works in which copyright protection subsists, and
determining the scope of such protection-that Feist squeezes entirely
into the concept of originality, and so into Section 102(a). Section
102(b), which makes no mention of originality except in using Section
102(a)'s term "original work[] of authorship, 52 has the statutory task of
setting limits to copyright protection. There is no need to smuggle those
limits into Section 102(a), and so no need to understand the term
"original" in that section in other than its straightforward sense of having
been independently created.
The Court in Feist disrupted this allocation of responsibilities by
protection significantly different.

48.
49.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).

50.
5-1.

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991).
Id. at 360.

52.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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finding a limitation on the scope of copyright protection in Section
102(a).53
The Court read into the term "original" a creativity
requirement that amounts to a restriction on the scope of coverage of
original works of authorship.5 4 The extent of the disruption was masked
in Feist by the fact that Rural's directory contained "some foreword text,
as well as original material in its yellow pages advertisements, 5 5 so that
the work as a whole had the "modicum of creativity ' 56 necessary to
obtain a copyright. In the absence of such extraneous text, given the
Court's analysis, no copyright protection would have subsisted in the
work at all.
Continuing to blur the roles of Sections 102(a) and (b), the Court
used its originality+creativity requirement not only to limit the works in
which copyright protection subsists under Section 102(a), but also to
determine the scope of that protection, thereby virtually ignoring the
existence of Section 102(b). 57 Not only did Rural's work as a whole
have to meet the originality+creativity requirement, but there would be
infringement only if the "constituent elements" that were copied were
also "original" in the Court's strengthened sense. 58 Combining its
conflation of individual listings with the facts that they describe and its
addition of a "creativity" element to the concept of originality intended
to apply to entire works, the Court justified its holding on the grounds
that Rural did not create the facts that its listings report. 59 Its argument
for that conclusion made no reference to Section 102(b) or to the
idea/expression or fact/expression distinctions, 60 all of which were made
superfluous by the Court's sole reliance on its originality+creativity
requirement.
The Feist Court made a perfunctory effort to connect Section 102(a)
with Section 102(b) through the idea/expression or fact/expression
distinction. It observed that to promote science and technology,
"copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work.... This principle, known as the idea/expression or

53. Feist,499 U.S. at 345, 355.
54. Id. at 345.
55. Id. at 361.
56. Id. at 346.
57. Having described the originality+creativity required in order for copyright
protection to subsist in a work, the Court added, "The mere fact that a work is
copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected. Originality
remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only
to those components of a work that are original to the author." Id. at 348.
58. Id. at 361.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 361-64.
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fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship., 6 1 The
Court explained that the reason why "no author may copyright facts or
ideas" is that "[t]he copyright is limited to those aspects of the worktermed 'expression'-that display the stamp of the author's
originality., 62 Under this account, the "expression" in a work is original,
and so is protected against copying under Section 102(a), while such
protection does not extend to the unoriginal other half of the dichotomy,
Section 102(b) content.
However, the concept of originality, and especially the concept of
originality+creativity, plays no role in Section 102(b), nor in the
idea/expression distinction. The progress of science and technology is,
after all, most supported by the creation of works embodying original
ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts,
principles, and discoveries, 63 so Section 102(b) cannot be denying
protection to those items on the grounds that they are not original.
Moreover, the Court found that Section 102(b) applies to facts by
equating facts with the "discoveries" referred to in the section.64 Yet
discoveries, like ideas and the other items referred to in the section, can
be original; indeed, they are so almost by definition. Thus facts, in the
sense in which they are immunized from copyright protection under
Section 102(b), can, like other Section 102(b) content, be original. They
can also be unoriginal, and it makes no difference to Section 102(b) or to
the idea/expression or fact/expression distinctions.65
Section 102(b) and the Immunization of Content
Section 102(b) immunizes against copyright protection the left-hand
side of the idea/expression and fact/expression distinctions. Contrary to
Feist, the underlying distinction (or "dichotomy" in the Court's
61. Id. at 349-50 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 350 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 547 (1985)).
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
64. Feist, 499 U.S. at 356 ("Section 102(b) is universally understood to prohibit any
copyright in facts," citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547, 556. Accord, 1 MELVIN B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[E] (2006) [hereinafter
NIMMER] (equating facts with "discoveries")).
65. The irrelevance of originality, in the standard sense or the Feist Court's
enhanced sense, to Section 102(b) content accounts for the fact that the two elements of
infringement according to Feist-"(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original," id. at 361-are in fact not sufficient
for infringement. The ideas in a work are constituent elements of it, but copying original
constituent ideas in a work does not constitute infringement. In the case of purportedly
factual works that are in fact false, copying portions of such works that are necessary to
convey their purportedly factual content would typically not constitute infringement, but
such non-factual elements of the work would be "original" in the Court's sense.
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terminology) the section relies on is not between the unoriginal and the
original but between content and the language that communicates it. We
use language to communicate ideas, concepts, discoveries, and other
Section 102(b) content. The literary works in which we communicate
them may be protected by copyright, but those works' Section 102(b)
content-"the ideas and information conveyed by a work" 66-is not
protected. The reason goes to the core of the purpose of copyright law:
we want ideas and discoveries to be communicated as widely as possible,
not only through the literary works .that initially present them but also in
other literary works written by readers of the originals, works that pass
on those ideas and discoveries to others, modify and elaborate on them,
and generally engage in discussion of them, thus promoting "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts. 67 We grant copyright protection to
literary works so that they will set forth Section 102(b) content to be
communicated to others without restriction on the further use or
communication of such content. To permit copyright protection to
extend to such content would therefore undermine the very purpose of
copyright law. 68
The value of ideas and information lies partly in the fact that they
are, for practical purposes, public goods. Public goods are nonrival and
nonexclusive: for any given level of production, the marginal cost of
providing them to an additional person is zero, and additional people
cannot be excluded from consuming them.69 However, like other public
goods, information may have a substantial cost of creation; significant
investment of time, money, labor, and creativity is often required to
create information. "[I]nformation is expensive to produce, cheap to
reproduce, and [therefore] difficult to profit from.",70 This situation
66. Id. at 350.
67. Id. at 349 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
68. It would be theoretically possible to have a strong form of copyright protection
in which the ideas, discoveries, and processes expressed in a literary work were protected
against copying. (Arthur Miller proposes a limited common law form of protection of
ideas, distinguishing it from copyright protection, in Arthur R. Miller, Common Law
Protectionfor Productsof the Mind: An "Idea " Whose Time Has Come, 119 H.L.R. 705
(2006).) Such protection would be weaker than patent protection, since it would permit
independent creation and use of Section 102(b) content even if previously expressed in
another work, but stronger than the protection provided under the Copyright Act, which
not only permits the copying of Section 102(b) content but exists to promote its creation
so as to make it available for copying. Such a strong form of copyright protection would
not, of course, subsist in the ideas and discoveries themselves, which are not literary
works, but would subsist in literary works in such a strong form as to prohibit the
copying of Section 102(b) content.
69. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBtNFELD, MICROECONOMICS 64849 (3d ed. 1995).
70.

WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL

TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70 (1969).

See also Kenneth J. Arrow,
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prompts the introduction of a property right to enable the creators of
information to profit from their work and so provide an incentive for
such creation. That right is copyright, which subsists not in information
itself but in the works that contain it. 7 1 However, if the scheme is to
achieve its purpose, the right to profit from those works must not
significantly undermine the value of the information in them. Permitting
the copyright in a literary work to prohibit the further dissemination of its
content would do just that.
Therefore, the Copyright Act, through Section 102(b), immunizes
ideas, discoveries, and other Section 102(b) content from the copyright
protection granted in Section 102(a). Such immunization is independent
of the originality of the Section 102(b) content or of the creativity of the
literary work that contains such content. Section 102(b) thereby limits
the scope of the copyright protection that under Section 102(a) subsists
in "original works of authorship"-works that were independently
created. It does so in order to ensure that copyright protection for a
literary work does not undermine the purpose for which the work was
created.
This scheme has no place for the concept of "creativity" introduced
in Feist as a restriction on the standard concept of originality. We do not
want courts to be in the business of evaluating the creativity of factual
works, and we do want to encourage the creation-i.e., the independent
writing-of all sorts of factual works, including those that report only
"raw facts." Indeed, one hopes that it was not the lack of creativity but
the need for such raw facts, in the form of white pages telephone listings,
that provided the motivation for the Feist Court, to its credit and to the

Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16,
National Bureau of Economic Research (1962), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF
COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION 227, 232-34 (Donald M. Lamberton ed., 1996)
(difficulty of optimal allocation of and creating a market for information); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 325, 326 (1989) (given "public good" aspect of intellectual property, copyright
law trades off costs of limiting access to a work against benefits of providing incentives
to create the work). Cf JEREMY BENTHAM, 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 71 (1843)

("He who has no hope that he shall reap, will not take the trouble to sow. But that which
one man has invented, all the world can imitate.").
71. We do not want the property right to subsist in the information itself, for we
would then lose the value that the information has in virtue of being nonrival. Nor would
we have much success in enforcing such a right, given the difficulty of keeping
information from being disseminated. Creating a property right that subsists instead in a
particular tangible expression of the information encourages the creation of such an
expression, and so of the information and of further means of disseminating it, without (if
we properly limit the right) undermining the value of the information and its nonrival
nature.
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surprise of many,7 2 to reverse the Tenth Circuit decision below. Since
we want to encourage the creation of all sorts of factual works, the
Court's concept of creativity, under which the mere reporting of facts is
not creative, got things backwards. It penalizes for a lack of "creativity"
the very works, factual works, that primarily "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts. 73
Given the utilitarian purpose of the
Copyright Clause, it would be counterproductive to establish a
"creativity" requirement for obtaining copyright protection that by its
nature affects only factual works, especially when it affects them not
because the process of producing a factual work is necessarily any less
creative than that of producing a fictional one, but simply because "facts
do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. 74 The reason to provide
an incentive for the creation of literary works is to obtain the benefit of
the content of those works, and especially, given the Copyright Clause,
their factual content. By focusing on its concept of creativity, the Court
diverted discussion from its proper focus of how to keep copyright
protection from unduly interfering with obtaining the full benefit of the
content of a work to fruitless discussions of the nature of the required
creativity.

72. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 198 (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY].
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Court's denigration in Feist of the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine was justified insofar as the doctrine "handed out proprietary interests
in facts and declared that authors are absolutely precluded from saving time and effort by
relying upon the facts contained in prior works," Feist, 499 U.S. at 354. Sometimes,
however, the Court appeared to confuse the rejection of a proprietary interest in facts
with a rejection of copyright for a work that consists "merely" of a collection of facts, on
the grounds that it does not exhibit sufficient creativity. An author who industriously
collects, or even lazily collects, facts and then creates, as opposed to copies, a directory
of them has created a literary work that should, as such, be entitled to copyright
protection. That copyright does not, of course, prohibit another from proceeding to
collect the same facts and creating, not copying, his own directory of those facts. Norand this is where some "sweat of the brow" decisions went wrong--does it prohibit
another from using the first author's directory as a source of information, on the way to
creating her own directory that is, to the extent reasonably possible, different in wording,
organization, and selection. However, as discussed below, a determination of whether a
second directory infringes the copyright in the first does not involve an evaluation of the
creativity exhibited by the first.
74. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). A focus on
the author's creativity rather than on the utility of a work is characteristic of a copyright
regime incorporating a doctrine of moral rights, such as that of French copyright law,
rather than the utilitarian American regime. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 135-61
(Ch. 5, "The Two Cultures of Copyright").
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The Significance of a Work's Purpose
Immunizing Ideas Under the Nichols Model in FictionalWorks
Not all content of a literary work is immunized by Section 102(b).
For example, most content of fictional works, such as the details of plot,
characters, and settings, is not immunized. The content of fictional
works below the level of ideas is not Section 102(b) content because it is
not the purpose of fictional works to convey the stories they tell so that
such stories may be repeated in other works. Fictional works serve their
primary purpose simply through being read by readers for their
enjoyment and edification. Since their stories are not factual, there is no
need to repeat them in order to advance science and technology, or to
advance knowledge in general.
However, providing enjoyment and edification to readers is only
one, albeit the primary, purpose of fiction. Another purpose is to provide
ideas that may be freely discussed and communicated and used by other
authors in creating other fictional works. That purpose does affect the
advancement of knowledge, and Section 102(b) keeps copyright
protection from interfering with it by immunizing ideas, even if they
appear in fictional rather than factual works.
Judge Hand's decision in Nichols v. UniversalPictures Corp.7 5 sets
out how the process works in the case of fictional works. One abstracts
from the details of plot, character, and setting of a fictional work until
reaching the level of "ideas.''76 That level of abstraction, to which
copyright protection does not extend, is determined to some extent by the
meaning of the term "idea" but more usefully as the boundary above
which we do not want to prohibit others from using the work's content.77
Such a prohibition would unduly restrict the range within which other
authors may work by depriving them of stories (plots, settings, and
characters at a certain level of abstraction) that could be learned from the
work and used to create new works-the "building blocks" or tools of
their trade. An accused work infringes an original work only if there is
sufficient copying at levels of abstraction below the level of ideas.78
Under the Nichols model, an author has two types of "means of
expression" to fill in the right-hand side of the idea/expression
distinction: (a) content-based means of expression, i.e., the details of
plot, character, and setting, and (b) word-based means of expression, i.e.,

75.
76.
77.
78.

45 F.2d 119(2dCir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
See id. at 121.
See id.
See id.
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the specific wording chosen to present those details.7 9 If the work is
original in the straightforward sense of having been independently
created, neither the creativity of the ideas expressed nor that of their
means of expression, whether content-based or word-based, is relevant to
the issue of the subsistence of copyright protection in the work or of its
infringement.
This level of copyright protection for fictional works permits such
works to communicate content-their ideas-that may be used by other
authors, while restricting the reuse by other authors of the means of
expressing those ideas. The combination appears to do justice to the
purpose of fictional literary works: communicating ideas (at least in
some cases) for further use while entertaining and edifying through the
means of presentation of those ideas.
Immunizing Content in Factual Works
Factual works have quite a different purpose, which cannot be
served by imposing copyright protection as strong as that appropriate for
fictional works. The purpose of factual works is to communicate, for
consideration and reuse by others, content not only at the level of ideas
but down to the smallest level of detail. As a general matter, all the
information in a factual work must be available for reuse by others if
such works are to serve their purpose fully.
This difference of purpose means that the step of abstraction, of
moving from the specific details of the content of a work to a level that
omits some of its content, has different effects in the case of fictional and
factual works. In the case of fictional works, little is lost by prohibiting
the copying of specific details because the work is not intended to
provide factual information through those details, and because such a
prohibition does not unduly inhibit the creation of works by other fiction
writers or the consideration of the ideas expressed in a work. As one
abstracts to broader descriptions of plot and character, there continues to
be no problem about copyright protection inhibiting the transmission of
factual information, but the potential inhibition of the ability of others to
79. See id. An example shows the difference between the two senses of
"expression."
If we apply Nichols' "patterns of increasing generality" (actually,
increasing abstraction) to the plot of Shakespeare's Romeo & Juliet, we get to the idea
expressed by the sentence, "Two young people from feuding families fall in love, and the
family feud leads to tragedy." Different means of word-based expression of that idea
would consist of different wording for the idea at the same level of abstraction, e.g.,
perhaps, "a young man falls in love with a young woman, and she returns his love, but
their families are hostile to each other, and that leads to a sad end." Different contentbased means of expression of the idea would be different detailed plots, one of which
might be the specific plot of Romeo & Juliet, that show the events described at this high
level of abstraction being worked out in a specific way.
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create new works and discuss ideas becomes of increasing concern.
Abstraction works differently, however, in the case of factual
works, for abstraction, by definition, removes information. A more
specific statement contains more information than one derived from it by
describing the entities involved less specifically, so it is typically more
valuable in advancing the progress of science. Applying to factual works
"patterns of increasing generality" 80 in the manner of the Nichols model
would result in restatements that leave out more and more factual detail
and therefore are of less and less use for the advancement of knowledge.
This difference of purpose also means that, for the most part, only
one of the two means of expression protectable by copyright in the case
of fictional works can be protected in the case of factual works. Contentbased means of expression, the details of plot and other fictional
elements through which a work of fiction fills out its ideas, 81 cannot be
protected against copying in the case of factual works because what are
only stories in the case of fictional works are factual information in the
case of factual ones. The value of such works lies in communicating that
information for use by others, including copying the information into
other works, so readers cannot be precluded from copying the
information in them if the value of such works is not to be seriously
undermined. Only word-based means of expression, the selection of
words through which that content is expressed, can be protected against
copying.
The term "selection of words" is used here in a broad sense, to
include every choice available to an author, from the choice of individual
words to the creation of sentences and their organization into paragraphs
and higher levels of organization, in order to express certain content. In
the case of most types of factual work, there will be many ways of
expressing the information in the work, making it possible for other
authors to present that material without copying at all closely the
sentences or their organization used in the work.
In some instances, however, there are few practical alternatives for

80. Id. Although what Judge Hand means in Nichols by "patterns of increasing
generality" is clear and correct in context, the terms "generality" and "generalization"
instead of "abstraction" can prove misleading. If we generalize from a specific
statement, in the sense of saying about a larger group what the initial statement said about
a smaller group, the resulting general statement contains more information that the
specific one. However, that is not the sort of more "generalized" statement envisioned by
Nichols, which fits more closely the model of moving from saying that a particular A is B
to "Some A's are B's" rather than to "All A's are B's." The statement that a particular A
is B contains more information that the statement that some A's are B's and less than the
statement that all A's are B's. The term "abstraction" is less likely to misleadingly imply
a move to "All A's are B's" than is the term "generalization."
81. See id.
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presenting the information in a factual work. A telephone directory is
such a case. Rural's listing was in the form it was-surname, first name,
middle initial, address, and telephone number-not because the listing
reflects a raw fact that the author was so lacking in creativity as not to be
able to describe more expressively, but because this is the information
needed by those who wish to use the directory, and this is the only
practical manner in which to present that information. Since it is the
82
only feasible way, it is the standard, indeed "practically inevitable"
way. The relevance of such practical inevitability to copyright law is
not, however, that it shows a lack of creativity that should deprive an
author of copyright protection, but that it requires us to permit close
copying if the work is to fulfill its purpose of communicating
information that may be used by readers as they see fit. That is what the
Court was in fact doing. in Feist, and it required neither the concept of
originality nor that of creativity to achieve that goal. The Court needed
only to recognize, as it did tacitly, that copyright protection should not
prohibit copying when doing so would make it unreasonably difficult for
the information contained in a factual work to be further communicated.
The protected/unprotected distinction is therefore, in the case of
standard literary works,83 the distinction between a literary work and its
content available for further dissemination.
Copyright protection
subsists in the literary work pursuant to Section 102(a), but the scope of
that protection depends upon what content, from among that roughly set
out in Section 102(b), the work is intended to pass on for further
communication by others, and therefore on whether the work is one of
(purported) fact or fiction.
Feist ignored this straightforward
interpretation of Section 102 and instead sought to limit from the outset,
through the concept of originality+creativity, 84 the matter in which
copyright protection subsists. In order to do so it ignored the standard
meaning of the term "original" in copyright law to add a "creativity"
requirement and sought to enshrine a single distinction, its enhanced
original/unoriginal distinction, as the basis for determining the scope of
protection in all literary works, whatever their purpose. Not only was its
argument based on a metaphysical confusion, but it was unnecessary: the
Court's laudable purpose, permitting the copying of Rural's telephone
listings, could be accomplished by limiting the scope of protection in
82. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
83. Computer programs are not standard literary works and raise different issues of
purpose and scope of protection. Although the general principle that the scope of
protection must be limited so as not to undermine the purpose of a work applies to
computer programs as well as to standard literary works, I will not discuss computer
programs further here.
84. Id. at 345.
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light of the purpose of a work. Protection is "strong" for works of
fiction, not because they are creative but because they do not serve the
purpose of conveying information for further use; copyright protection
may therefore extend to the stories they tell, be they creative or not.
Protection is weaker for factual works because they do have the purpose
of conveying information, the stories they tell, for unfettered use by
others; their purpose would be undermined by providing the same level
of protection as for fictional works. "Thin" copyright protection is not a
penalty for lack of creativity but recognition of the purpose of factual
works.85
A Principle of Immunity Based on Content
The Inadequacy of the Idea/Expressionand Fact/ExpressionDistinctions
The items listed in Section 102(b) provide a practical guide to the
concept of content that is the basis for the protected/unprotected
distinction. They fall under either the idea/expression distinction, which
covers the immunity of ideas, concepts, and principles, which may
appear in fictional or factual works, or the fact/expression distinction,
which covers discoveries and, in a different way, processes, procedures,
systems, and methods of operation, s6 all of which appear in factual
works. The content of a fictional work to be available for further
communication (as opposed to simply enjoyed) begins at the level of
abstraction of ideas. Both the idea/expression and fact/expression
distinctions are instances of the broader distinction between the content
to be communicated by a work (and to be copied in other works) and the
means of expression of that content. The difference between them lies in
the purpose of the work, i.e., the content to be disseminated by it.
85. Only the highest level purpose of a work is relevant, that of whether the work is
(purportedly) factual or fictional, i.e., whether its purpose is to communicate information
rather than to entertain or edify (or however we want to characterize the purpose of
fictional works). Given that broad categorization, any subsidiary purpose is ordinarily
irrelevant.
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The purpose of these four items in the list is to show
that, no matter how closely a work describes something in the world, copyright protection
does not give the author of the work any rights to that entity as a result of the copyright in
the work. As things in the world that may be described by a factual work, they are
immunized as is any other content of such a work. There should be no need to
pigeonhole an entity in the world within any of the specific categories in Section 102(b),
for the point is not the special characteristics of those categories but the immunity of
things in the world, other than literary works, from the scope of copyright protection. By
contrast, if a fictional work describes a procedure that does not actually exist, e.g., an
elaborate procedure to be followed in order to destroy an evil wizard, the fictional
procedure will not be immunized against copyright protection, in that describing it in
another fictional work could contribute toward a finding of infringement by that work.
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However, neither the idea/expression distinction nor the
fact/expression distinction is suited to the task of determining the scope
of copyright protection for factual works. Not only is the Nichols
concept of "idea" founded on the assumption that the level of ideas lies
above the level at which the work tells its full story, so that matter below
that story-telling level will be protected by copyright law and unavailable
for copying, 87 but nothing in the idea/expression distinction otherwise
makes it appropriate for use with factual works. By setting the level of
ideas at the lowest level of detail, so that the entire story told by a work
is considered an idea and is therefore not protectable, one can achieve the
goal of permitting the transmission of the work's factual content. But
there is no reason, in terms of anyone's (and certainly not Judge Hand's)
concept of an idea or the idea/expression distinction, to set the level of
ideas at that lowest level. Such a move has no motivation or rational
basis in the idea/expression distinction and misses the true reason for
different levels of protection being accorded to fictional and factual
works: the purpose (and so value) of the work.88 In sophisticated hands,
the idea/expression distinction can provide the basis for thoughtful
consideration of the proper scope of protection in a particular instance,
but since it is the wrong tool for the job, conclusions based on it are
inevitably tendentious and distorted by irrelevant considerations.8 9
87. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
88. For example, in Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d
485 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1037 (1984), the court stated,
One consequence of the policy in favor of free use of ideas is that the degree of
substantial similarity required to show infringement varies according to the
type of work and the ideas expressed in it.... Some ideas can be expressed in
myriad ways, while others allow only a narrow range of expression. Fictional
works generally fall into the first category....
Factual works are- different. Subsequent authors wishing to express the ideas
contained in a factual work often can choose from only a narrow range of
expression.... Therefore, similarity of expression may have to amount to
verbatim reproduction or very close paraphrasing before a factual work will be
deemed infringed.
Id. at 488 (emphasis added). However, under our normal understanding of the term
"idea," the ideas expressed in a factual work are not at the lowest level of factual detail
but at a higher level of abstraction. Thus recasting the lowest level of detail of factual
works, which it must be possible to copy without infringement, as the level of "ideas" in
an effort to "explain" the absence of copyright protection actually provides no
explanation at all. It simply changes the concept of "idea" to accommodate the
conclusion required for another reason, that of permitting the communication of factual
content.
89. For example, for neither fictional nor factual works is it relevant, in determining
the proper scope of protection, what "idea" the author intended to express. In the case of
fictional works, what matters is the level of abstraction at which immunity is granted,
which may depend upon the ideas expressed in a work but not upon what the author
thinks to be the ideas expressed. That seems apparent in the case of fictional works, but
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One might then turn to the so-called "fact/expression" distinction to
determine the scope of protection for factual works, but that has
amounted to little more than alternative wording for the idea/expression
distinction applied to factual works, with no underlying rationale to
provide additional guidance. 90 The Court referred to the distinction in
Feist, distinguishing between "the underlying facts" and "the precise
words used to present them." 9' That characterization is innocent enough,
but it does not tell us how to distinguish between the two, and the
Court's additional gloss provides no help. It adds,
In Harper & Row, for example, we explained that President Ford

could not prevent others from copying bare historical facts from his
autobiography, but that he could prevent others from copying his
"subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures." Where the
compilation author adds no written expression but rather lets the facts

the point is often ignored when the idea/expression distinction is applied to factual works,
where analyses often purportedly turn on determining what was the author's idea. Thus,
even in a discussion as sophisticated as that in Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700
(2d Cir. 1991), decided a few months after Feist, the majority opinion and dissent
characterized their difference in terms of what idea the author of the work, a form with
baseball information, intended to express. However, as long as an author's intent is to
say something true, as it was in Kregos, what the author thinks of as his idea should be
irrelevant to the scope of protection accorded to his work. We would hardly expect, in an
infringement trial in such a case, the plaintiff to testify as to what his "idea" was in
writing the work in question.
90. The idea/expression distinction is typically applied in the form of the merger
doctrine, but that doctrine provides no independent rationale for the choice of the idea
whose merger is in question or the resulting conclusion as to infringement. The merger
doctrine tries to accomplish through the language of idea and expression what is really a
matter of the communication of factual content. Idea and expression (or idea and fact)
never really "merge," but the instances in which the merger doctrine treats them as doing
so are those in which content can be effectively communicated in only one or a limited
range of ways, so a new work that is to communicate such content effectively must use
wording identical or very similar to that used by the original work. In Kregos, the
majority found no merger because it took the idea in question to be at a more abstract
level than did the dissent, which found the idea expressed in the author's form to be a
"very specific idea," id. at 711, that could be expressed in a limited number of ways and
so "merged" with its expression. Id. at 711, 716. The decision turned on the majority's
and dissent's respective choices of the "idea" in question, but although their thoughtful
opinions discuss factors relevant to the scope of protection, their focus on the
idea/expression distinction instead of on the issue of the content to be communicated by
the work blurred what should have been the dispositive issues. The Second Circuit's
treatment of basically the same issue soon thereafter in CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean
Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), further demonstrates the
difficulty of addressing the scope of protection issues that arise in the case of factual
compilations in terms of the idea/expression distinction (and so the merger doctrine). Id.
at 69-73. In neither Kregos nor CCC did the court invoke the fact/expression distinction
as an alternative to or for further guidance in applying the idea/expression distinction.
91. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
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speak for themselves, the expressive element is more elusive.

However, the choice in determining the scope of protection is seldom
between "bare historical facts," even if we know what they are, and
"subjective descriptions." Most history consists of neither extreme but
of attempts to objectively and coherently describe a world that does not
come to us divided into any kinds of facts.93 The same, of course, is true
of other sorts of factual works.

92. Id. at 348-49 (citations omitted) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57, 563 (1985)).
93. Consider, for example, the following passage from Barbara Tuchman's The
Guns ofAugust, a historical work, which describes national responses to the beginning of
World War I:
In France war came and was accepted as a kind of national fate, however
deeply a part of the people would have preferred to avoid it. Almost in awe, a
foreign observer reported the upsurge of "national devotion" joined with an
"entire absence of excitement" in a people of whom it had so often been
predicted that anarchical influences had undermined their patriotism and would
prove fatal in the event of war. Belgium, where there occurred one of the rare
appearances of the hero in history, was lifted above herself by the
uncomplicated conscience of her King and, faced with the choice to acquiesce
or resist, took less than three hours to make her decision, knowing it might be
mortal.
Britain had no Albert and no Alsace. Her weapons were ready but not her will.
Over the past ten years she had studied and prepared for the war that was now
upon her and had developed, since 1905, a system called the "War Book"
which left noihing to the traditional British practice of muddling through. All
orders to be issued in the event of war were ready for signature; envelopes were
addressed; notices and proclamations were either printed or set up in type, and
the King never moved from London without having with him those that
required his immediate signature. The method was plain; the muddle was in
the British mind.
BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 112-13 (1962). We would naturally say that
this passage states certain facts about the comparative attitudes of France, Belgium, and
Britain at the outset of World War I. One might also express similar content, in a more
pedestrian fashion, with the following sentence: "France accepted the onset of World
War I calmly, and Belgium's decision to enter the war was led heroically by its king, but
Britain, while physically prepared for war as a result of ten years' effort, did not have the
will for it." Does this sentence state "the bare facts" expressed by the longer passage,
with the rest being a "subjective description" or clothing with "an original collocation of
words"? It appears that more than a pleasing style is lost in the transition from the
author's passage to the summary sentence. Content is lost as well, for the former
contains not only such details as the existence of the British War Book but also the nature
of the psychological attitudes so felicitously described by the author. Must one, then,
copy the passage almost verbatim in order to convey its factual content? There are no
simple answers to such questions, but they cannot be rationally answered without
consciously addressing the issue of the information in such a work that we want to be
available for further dissemination and the extent to which it can be effectively
communicated through different words and organization.
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Focusing on Content
Both the idea/expression and fact/expression distinctions are
instances of the content/expression distinction. The extent to which the
content of a work is Section 102(b) content, i.e., is immunized against
copyright protection, depends upon whether the work is one of fiction or
fact (or, in cases not discussed here, is a computer program). Once we
have recognized the critical role of the purpose of a work, and
specifically the purpose of factual works of communicating information
available to be used in other works, the clearest way of determining the
scope of protection of such works is through a principle of immunity that
reflects that purpose. Here is a simple version of such a principle, where
W 1 is an original work (in the straightforward sense of having been
independently created) and W 2 is another work that contains material
copied from WI:
Similarities that are reasonably necessary in order for W 2 to
express effectively factual content in W1 should not be counted
when determining whether W 2 infringes W1.
A principle of immunity for content communication, as a
rationalization and explanation of Section 102(b), does not provide a test
for infringement but a limit on the infringement that would otherwise be
determined under the substantial similarity standard, 94 which I will not
discuss here. Note the following concerning the elements of this form of
the principle:
(1) "reasonably necessary": The similarities must be reasonably
necessary in order to meet two goals: expressing factual content in W 1 ,
and expressing it effectively. The term "reasonably" is an open-textured
term, such as the common legal terms "reasonable" (as in "reasonable
man"), "substantial" (as in "substantial similarity"), and "due" (as in
"due process" or "due care"), that can be applied to take into account
appropriate factors in specific circumstances.
(2) "express effectively": W 2 may contain the same factual content
as W, but in such a form that it is impractical for readers to find the
information they want in it, thus reducing or eliminating the value of that
content. The immunity for organizing material in W 2 so that it can be
94. See, e.g., II GOLDSTEIN § 7.3.1.2 at 7:30 ("[Tlhe plaintiff must demonstrate not
only that the defendant appropriated its protected expression, but also that audiences will
find the expression in the defendant's work substantially similar to the expression in the
plaintiffs work"); 4 NIMMER § 13.03[A] ("Just as copying is an essential element of
copyright infringement, so substantial similarity between the plaintiffs and defendant's
works is an essential element of actionable copying."); Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579,
583-84 (4th Cir. 1996); Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
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used effectively, even if that makes W 2 more similar to W1 , addresses
this problem.
What is reasonably necessary to express content
effectively ("effectively" also being an open-textured term) will depend
upon the nature of the content, how it is to be used, the nature of the
audience, and in some circumstances other factors. A white pages
telephone directory is at one extreme, since it consists of small packets of
information that can be effectively used only if arranged in a particular
manner. Thus in Feist it was reasonably necessary for the telephone
directory not only to contain certain content but for the content to be in
the alphabetical order of the last names of subscribers. In the case of a
standard literary work, say a scientific article, the constraints on the
arrangement of the content relate more to such factors as intelligibility
(including considerations of anaphora, the picking up by a subsequent
linguistic unit of the reference of an earlier unit) and logical flow than to
simple accessibility.
(3) "factual content": As is generally the case in discussing factual
content, this should be interpreted as "purportedly factual content."
Whether or not the statements in W, are in fact true is irrelevant. What
matters is that they are being asserted, i.e., put forth as being true. On a
different point, the term "factual" in this simple form of the principle
does not consider the type of factual content that is copied and includes
what is sometimes referred to as "opinion." If a statement is put forth as
true, whether or not it is "only the author's opinion," it is considered
"factual content" in this form of the principle. Nor does this form of the
principle distinguish among standard factual content in other respects,
e.g. in terms of complexity, importance, or availability from other
sources.
(4) "factual content in Wj": The principle as stated here is
intentionally somewhat ambiguous as to how much factual content it can
be applied to, but the most natural interpretation is that it applies to any
content in W1, i.e., as if it read "Similarities that are reasonably necessary
in order for W2 to express effectively any factual content in W , should
not be counted when determining whether W 2 infringes Wj." Under this
interpretation, the principle may be applied so as to permit the copying of
all, or any portion of, the factual content in a literary work, as in the case
of a white pages telephone directory. That may be too much immunity in
some circumstances.
(5) "should not be counted when determining whether W 2 infringes
W1 ." This means that when comparing W, and W2 , the similarities that
fall under the immunity principle should not themselves contribute to a
finding of infringement. This does not mean that they must be ignored
when determining whether W 2 infringes Wi as a result of other
similarities between them. For example, immune material may be
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interspersed among protected material in both W1 and W2, and the
organization of the immune material among the protected material may
make the organization of the protected material more or less similar in
W, and W 2 and so make infringement more or less likely. It would,
therefore, go too far to say that the immune material should not be
"considered" when determining whether W2 infringes W .
1
As points (1)-(5) make clear, the principle as stated here leaves open
a number of issues. A central issue in any such principle is when two
works express the same content (and so, if the content purports to be
factual, the same factual content). The issue is not straightforward and
may benefit from further analysis. On a related point, we may (or may
not) want to try to distinguish between "fact" and "opinion," and so
provide a further gloss on the term "factual" as it appears in the principle.
In another direction, we may feel that the principle in its simple form
provides too much protection, because it fails to take account of the
information possessed by the intended audience for a work, and so
permits W2 to be more similar to W, than would be necessary if one took
advantage of the knowledge of that audience. In that case, we might
want to modify the principle to the following relativized version:
Similarities that are reasonably necessary in order for W2 to
express effectively to the intended audience factual content in W
should not be counted when determining whether W2 infringes
W1.

Under this version of the principle, if W2 is directed to an audience
possessing specialized knowledge, e.g., molecular biologists -or soccer
fans, then we need not permit W2 to be as similar to W1 as it might
otherwise have to be, because the specialized knowledge will enable
readers to make inferences where persons
without such knowledge
95
would have to be told something directly.
Of course, the more flexibility we incorporate into an immunity
principle, the less certain its application in any specific circumstance.
The balance is a delicate one, as it must be in light of the paradox of
copyright protection. As in any situation in which the application of
open-textured terms, such as "reasonably" or "effectively," or difficult
terms such as "content," must be determined, the determination should
be made on a principled basis. In the case of the principle of immunity
for content communication, that basis should be supplied by the
underlying purpose of copyright law, the promotion of knowledge and

95. In a simple case, for example, if W2 is directed to a group that knows that all and
only A's are B's, W2 may not have to copy the use of"A" in W, but may use "B" instead,
in order to convey the content of W, to those knowledgeable readers.
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learning by encouraging the creation of factual works whose content may
be disseminated. As difficult as the balancing that goes into that
determination may sometimes be, other factors should not be permitted
to skew the application of these critical terms. The appropriate time for
such other considerations to enter, if at all, is in determining in a specific
case whether there should be a fair use exception to a finding of
infringement.
The possible need to add flexibility to the principle of immunity for
content communication and the need for open-textured terms in the
principle are not reasons to favor an analysis using the idea/expression or
fact/expression distinctions or the merger doctrine (much less Feist's
originality+creativity requirement). Application of those approaches
involves, or should involve, implicit application of the factors that are
explicit in a principle of immunity, but those approaches provide neither
a rationale or guidance for applying such factors in the case of factual
works nor a satisfactory alternative rationale for the determinations made
under an immunity principle. The express appearance of the factors in
such a principle enables us to consider them rationally, not ignore them
or hide their application under the guise of deciding what qualifies as an
"idea."
To the extent that an immunity principle leaves some
uncertainties and ambiguities unresolved, it identifies them and enables
us to knowingly address them on a principled basis. By contrast, reliance
on tendentious applications of the idea/expression distinction or merger
doctrine or on arbitrary decisions as to what constitutes a "modicum" of
creativity tends to sweep such questions under the rug, leaving the true
reasons for decisions as to infringement unexplained and unexplored.9 6
Conclusion
Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. marked
an important recognition by the Supreme Court of the importance of not

96. Other characterizations of the limits of copyright protection for factual works
also miss the critical importance of the transmission of factual content. For example, the
Nimmer treatise suggests that the amount of similarity required in order for W 2 to be
"substantially similar" to W1 "may vary according to circumstances," with "more
similarity [ ] required when less protectible matter is at issue," and "supersubstantial
similarity" required when dealing with "thin" works." 4 NIMMER § 13.03[A]. However,
there is no rationale for such a test. If W2 has a "supersubstantial similarity" to W,
because of virtual identity of factual content that cannot otherwise be effectively
communicated, there may be no infringement, whereas if two works have only
"substantial similarity" because of virtual identity of a smaller amount of content that
might be conveyed in a quite different way, there may be infringement. It is confusing
enough to use the term "idea" tendentiously in determining infringement; changing the
"substantial similarity" standard to reach a result based in fact on other criteria only
increases the confusion.
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permitting copyright protection to interfere with the communication of
information by factual works. Unfortunately, the Court chose to explain
its decision by introducing a new "creativity" element into the traditional
concept of originality as applied to a literary work and by finding in its
enhanced originality+creativity requirement the key to the scope of
protection. The Court's argument came down to saying that since factual
works refer to things that already exist (only if they are true, but the
Court ignored that condition), they cannot be "creative" unless they
contain some manipulations ("cloth[ing] facts with an original
collocation of words" or providing "an original selection or
arrangement" 97) to add creativity. However, in addition to confusing
language and the world and the two parts of Section 102, the Court
looked at the wrong point in the life of a literary work, its creation rather
than its use. The scope of copyright protection determines how a literary
work may be used, and that use should depend upon the purpose of the
work.
Once we focus on that purpose, we can provide a limitation on the
scope of copyright protection for factual works, in the form of a principle
of immunity for content communication. Such a principle enables us to
focus on the factors that should determine the scope of such protection,
providing an incentive for the creation of works that promote the
advancement of knowledge while not unduly restricting the
dissemination of such knowledge. The element of creativity, and
resulting novel concept of originality, introduced by the Court in Feist is
irrelevant to such a principle, and it has no useful role to play in
determining the scope of copyright protection for factual works.

97.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.

